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Moar cleanup.

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This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2022-12-16 12:37:43 -05:00
parent d415f1c31b
commit 4219ad3078
1 changed files with 26 additions and 15 deletions
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41
zssp/src/zssp.rs
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@ -695,7 +695,9 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
let mut kex_packet_len = 0;
for i in 0..fragments.len() {
let mut ff = fragments[i].as_ref();
debug_assert!(ff.len() >= MIN_PACKET_SIZE);
if ff.len() < MIN_PACKET_SIZE {
return Err(Error::InvalidPacket);
}
if i > 0 {
ff = &ff[HEADER_SIZE..];
}
@ -708,7 +710,8 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
}
let kex_packet_saved_ciphertext = kex_packet.clone(); // save for HMAC check later
// Key exchange packets begin (after header) with the session protocol version.
// Key exchange packets begin (after header) with the session protocol version. This could be
// changed in the future to support a different cipher suite.
if kex_packet[HEADER_SIZE] != SESSION_PROTOCOL_VERSION {
return Err(Error::UnknownProtocolVersion);
}
@ -720,9 +723,11 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
// packet decoding for noise initial key offer
// -> e, es, s, ss
////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
if kex_packet_len < (HEADER_SIZE + 1 + P384_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE + AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE + HMAC_SIZE + HMAC_SIZE) {
return Err(Error::InvalidPacket);
}
let plaintext_end = HEADER_SIZE + 1 + P384_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE;
let payload_end = kex_packet_len - (AES_GCM_TAG_SIZE + HMAC_SIZE + HMAC_SIZE);
let aes_gcm_tag_end = kex_packet_len - (HMAC_SIZE + HMAC_SIZE);
@ -760,14 +765,14 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
.ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?;
// Initial key derivation from starting point, mixing in alice's ephemeral public and the es.
let es_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let noise_ik_incomplete_es = Secret(hmac_sha512(
&hmac_sha512(&INITIAL_KEY, alice_e_public.as_bytes()),
noise_es.as_bytes(),
));
// Decrypt the encrypted part of the packet payload and authenticate the above key exchange via AES-GCM auth.
let mut c = AesGcm::new(
kbkdf512(es_key.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_AES_GCM_ALICE_TO_BOB).first_n::<AES_KEY_SIZE>(),
kbkdf512(noise_ik_incomplete_es.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_AES_GCM_ALICE_TO_BOB).first_n::<AES_KEY_SIZE>(),
false,
);
c.reset_init_gcm(canonical_header_bytes);
@ -803,14 +808,14 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
.ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?;
// Mix result of 'ss' agreement into master key.
let ss_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(es_key.as_bytes(), noise_ss.as_bytes()));
drop(es_key);
let noise_ik_incomplete_es_ss = Secret(hmac_sha512(noise_ik_incomplete_es.as_bytes(), noise_ss.as_bytes()));
drop(noise_ik_incomplete_es);
// Authenticate entire packet with HMAC-SHA384, verifying alice's identity via 'ss' secret that was
// just mixed into the key.
let hmac1 = &kex_packet[aes_gcm_tag_end..hmac1_end];
if !hmac_sha384_2(
kbkdf512(ss_key.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_HMAC).first_n::<48>(),
kbkdf512(noise_ik_incomplete_es_ss.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_HMAC).first_n::<48>(),
canonical_header_bytes,
&kex_packet_saved_ciphertext[HEADER_SIZE..aes_gcm_tag_end],
)
@ -901,17 +906,19 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
// NIST/FIPS allows HKDF with HMAC(salt, key) and salt is allowed to be anything. This way if the PSK is not
// FIPS compliant the compliance of the entire key derivation is not invalidated. Both inputs are secrets of
// fixed size so this shouldn't matter cryptographically.
let noise_ik_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let noise_ik_complete = Secret(hmac_sha512(
session.psk.as_bytes(),
&hmac_sha512(
&hmac_sha512(
&hmac_sha512(ss_key.as_bytes(), bob_e_keypair.public_key_bytes()),
&hmac_sha512(noise_ik_incomplete_es_ss.as_bytes(), bob_e_keypair.public_key_bytes()),
noise_ee.as_bytes(),
),
noise_se.as_bytes(),
),
));
drop(ss_key);
drop(noise_ik_incomplete_es_ss);
drop(noise_ee);
drop(noise_se);
// At this point we've completed Noise_IK key derivation with NIST P-384 ECDH, but now for hybrid and ratcheting...
@ -972,7 +979,7 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
// Encrypt reply packet using final Noise_IK key BEFORE mixing hybrid or ratcheting, since the other side
// must decrypt before doing these things.
let mut c = AesGcm::new(
kbkdf512(noise_ik_key.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_AES_GCM_BOB_TO_ALICE).first_n::<AES_KEY_SIZE>(),
kbkdf512(noise_ik_complete.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_AES_GCM_BOB_TO_ALICE).first_n::<AES_KEY_SIZE>(),
true,
);
c.reset_init_gcm(reply_canonical_header.as_bytes());
@ -981,8 +988,9 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
idx = safe_write_all(&mut reply_buf, idx, &gcm_tag)?;
let aes_gcm_tag_end = idx;
// Mix ratchet key from previous session key (if any) and Kyber1024 hybrid shared key (if any).
let mut session_key = noise_ik_key;
let mut session_key = noise_ik_complete;
if let Some(ratchet_key) = ratchet_key {
session_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(ratchet_key.as_bytes(), session_key.as_bytes()));
}
@ -1050,16 +1058,19 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
let noise_ee = offer.alice_e_keypair.agree(&bob_e_public).ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?;
let noise_se = app.get_local_s_keypair().agree(&bob_e_public).ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?;
let noise_ik_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let noise_ik_complete = Secret(hmac_sha512(
session.psk.as_bytes(),
&hmac_sha512(
&hmac_sha512(&hmac_sha512(offer.ss_key.as_bytes(), bob_e_public.as_bytes()), noise_ee.as_bytes()),
noise_se.as_bytes(),
),
));
drop(noise_ee);
drop(noise_se);
let mut c = AesGcm::new(
kbkdf512(noise_ik_key.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_AES_GCM_BOB_TO_ALICE).first_n::<AES_KEY_SIZE>(),
kbkdf512(noise_ik_complete.as_bytes(), KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_AES_GCM_BOB_TO_ALICE)
.first_n::<AES_KEY_SIZE>(),
false,
);
c.reset_init_gcm(canonical_header_bytes);
@ -1092,7 +1103,7 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> ReceiveContext<Application> {
// Mix ratchet key from previous session key (if any) and Kyber1024 hybrid shared key (if any).
let mut ratchet_count = 0;
let mut session_key = noise_ik_key;
let mut session_key = noise_ik_complete;
if bob_ratchet_key_id.is_some() && offer.ratchet_key.is_some() {
session_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(offer.ratchet_key.as_ref().unwrap().as_bytes(), session_key.as_bytes()));
ratchet_count = offer.ratchet_count;