diff --git a/node/C25519.hpp b/node/C25519.hpp
index 4dc7e5506..7b79173a2 100644
--- a/node/C25519.hpp
+++ b/node/C25519.hpp
@@ -78,15 +78,10 @@ public:
 	/**
 	 * Sign a message with a sender's key pair
 	 *
-	 * This takes the SHA-521 of msg[] and then signs the first 32 bytes of this
-	 * digest, returning it and the 64-byte ed25519 signature in signature[].
-	 * This results in a signature that verifies both the signer's authenticity
-	 * and the integrity of the message.
-	 *
-	 * This is based on the original ed25519 code from NaCl and the SUPERCOP
-	 * cipher benchmark suite, but with the modification that it always
-	 * produces a signature of fixed 96-byte length based on the hash of an
-	 * arbitrary-length message.
+	 * For legacy reasons ZeroTier ed25519 signatures end with an additional 32 bytes
+	 * that are the first 32 bytes of SHA512(msg). The verify() function considers these
+	 * bytes optional and will accept signatures of 64 or 96 bytes in length, checking
+	 * the hash bytes if they are present.
 	 *
 	 * @param myPrivate My private key
 	 * @param myPublic My public key
diff --git a/node/Identity.cpp b/node/Identity.cpp
index bde09e1b0..e1a4ed976 100644
--- a/node/Identity.cpp
+++ b/node/Identity.cpp
@@ -189,11 +189,8 @@ unsigned int Identity::sign(const void *data,unsigned int len,void *sig,unsigned
 
 			case P384:
 				if (siglen >= ZT_ECC384_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
-					// For P384 we sign SHA384(data | public keys) for added defense against any attack
-					// that attempted to decouple the two keys in some way. Otherwise this has no impact
-					// on the security of the signature (unless SHA384 had some serious flaw).
 					uint8_t h[48];
-					SHA384(h,data,len,&_pub,ZT_IDENTITY_P384_COMPOUND_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
+					SHA384(h,data,len,&_pub,ZT_IDENTITY_P384_COMPOUND_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE); // include C25519 public key in hash
 					ECC384ECDSASign(_priv.p384,h,(uint8_t *)sig);
 					return ZT_ECC384_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
 				}