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Fix a locking issue in ZSSP and use hmac_sha512_secret everywhere, also clean up something in macOS AES.

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This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2023-03-09 19:00:03 -05:00
parent 164c7bf561
commit d170d91b8e
2 changed files with 78 additions and 87 deletions
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23
crypto/src/aes_fruity.rs
View file

@ -56,9 +56,7 @@ extern "C" {
fn CCCryptorGCMReset(cryptor_ref: *mut c_void) -> i32;
}
pub struct AesGcm<const ENCRYPT: bool> (*mut c_void);
pub struct AesGcm<const ENCRYPT: bool>(*mut c_void);
impl<const ENCRYPT: bool> Drop for AesGcm<ENCRYPT> {
#[inline(always)]
@ -69,7 +67,10 @@ impl<const ENCRYPT: bool> Drop for AesGcm<ENCRYPT> {
impl<const ENCRYPT: bool> AesGcm<ENCRYPT> {
pub fn new<const KEY_SIZE: usize>(k: &Secret<KEY_SIZE>) -> Self {
debug_assert!(KEY_SIZE == 32 || KEY_SIZE == 24 || KEY_SIZE == 16, "AES supports 128, 192, or 256 bits keys");
debug_assert!(
KEY_SIZE == 32 || KEY_SIZE == 24 || KEY_SIZE == 16,
"AES supports 128, 192, or 256 bits keys"
);
unsafe {
let mut ptr: *mut c_void = null_mut();
assert_eq!(
@ -154,7 +155,6 @@ impl<const ENCRYPT: bool> AesGcm<ENCRYPT> {
}
tag
}
}
impl AesGcm<true> {
@ -172,8 +172,6 @@ impl AesGcm<false> {
}
}
pub struct Aes(Mutex<*mut c_void>, Mutex<*mut c_void>);
impl Drop for Aes {
@ -189,7 +187,10 @@ impl Drop for Aes {
impl Aes {
pub fn new<const KEY_SIZE: usize>(k: &Secret<KEY_SIZE>) -> Self {
unsafe {
debug_assert!(KEY_SIZE == 32 || KEY_SIZE == 24 || KEY_SIZE == 16, "AES supports 128, 192, or 256 bits keys");
debug_assert!(
KEY_SIZE == 32 || KEY_SIZE == 24 || KEY_SIZE == 16,
"AES supports 128, 192, or 256 bits keys"
);
let aes: Self = std::mem::zeroed();
assert_eq!(
CCCryptorCreateWithMode(
@ -234,7 +235,8 @@ impl Aes {
assert_eq!(data.len(), 16);
unsafe {
let mut data_out_written = 0;
CCCryptorUpdate(*self.0.lock().unwrap(), data.as_ptr().cast(), 16, data.as_mut_ptr().cast(), 16, &mut data_out_written);
let e = self.0.lock().unwrap();
CCCryptorUpdate(*e, data.as_ptr().cast(), 16, data.as_mut_ptr().cast(), 16, &mut data_out_written);
}
}
@ -243,7 +245,8 @@ impl Aes {
assert_eq!(data.len(), 16);
unsafe {
let mut data_out_written = 0;
CCCryptorUpdate(*self.1.lock().unwrap(), data.as_ptr().cast(), 16, data.as_mut_ptr().cast(), 16, &mut data_out_written);
let d = self.1.lock().unwrap();
CCCryptorUpdate(*d, data.as_ptr().cast(), 16, data.as_mut_ptr().cast(), 16, &mut data_out_written);
}
}
}

142
zssp/src/zssp.rs
View file

@ -12,10 +12,10 @@
use std::collections::{HashMap, HashSet};
use std::num::NonZeroU64;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicI64, AtomicU64, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, RwLock, Weak, MutexGuard};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex, MutexGuard, RwLock, Weak};
use zerotier_crypto::aes::{Aes, AesGcm};
use zerotier_crypto::hash::{hmac_sha512, SHA384, SHA384_HASH_SIZE, hmac_sha512_secret};
use zerotier_crypto::hash::{hmac_sha512_secret, SHA384, SHA384_HASH_SIZE};
use zerotier_crypto::p384::{P384KeyPair, P384PublicKey, P384_ECDH_SHARED_SECRET_SIZE};
use zerotier_crypto::secret::Secret;
use zerotier_crypto::{random, secure_eq};
@ -131,18 +131,18 @@ enum Offer {
}
struct SessionKey {
ratchet_key: Secret<BASE_KEY_SIZE>, // Key used in derivation of the next session key
ratchet_key: Secret<BASE_KEY_SIZE>, // Key used in derivation of the next session key
//receive_key: Secret<AES_256_KEY_SIZE>, // Receive side AES-GCM key
//send_key: Secret<AES_256_KEY_SIZE>, // Send side AES-GCM key
receive_cipher_pool: [Mutex<AesGcm<false>>; 4],// Pool of reusable sending ciphers
send_cipher_pool: [Mutex<AesGcm<true>>; 4], // Pool of reusable receiving ciphers
rekey_at_time: i64, // Rekey at or after this time (ticks)
created_at_counter: u64, // Counter at which session was created
rekey_at_counter: u64, // Rekey at or after this counter
expire_at_counter: u64, // Hard error when this counter value is reached or exceeded
ratchet_count: u64, // Number of rekey events
bob: bool, // Was this side "Bob" in this exchange?
confirmed: bool, // Is this key confirmed by the other side?
receive_cipher_pool: [Mutex<AesGcm<false>>; 4], // Pool of reusable sending ciphers
send_cipher_pool: [Mutex<AesGcm<true>>; 4], // Pool of reusable receiving ciphers
rekey_at_time: i64, // Rekey at or after this time (ticks)
created_at_counter: u64, // Counter at which session was created
rekey_at_counter: u64, // Rekey at or after this counter
expire_at_counter: u64, // Hard error when this counter value is reached or exceeded
ratchet_count: u64, // Number of rekey events
bob: bool, // Was this side "Bob" in this exchange?
confirmed: bool, // Is this key confirmed by the other side?
}
impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
@ -357,9 +357,7 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
}
// Encrypt and add authentication tag.
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(
&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES>(noise_es.as_bytes())
);
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES>(noise_es.as_bytes()));
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&create_message_nonce(PACKET_TYPE_ALICE_NOISE_XK_INIT, 1));
gcm.aad(&offer.noise_h);
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut init_packet[AliceNoiseXKInit::ENC_START..AliceNoiseXKInit::AUTH_START]);
@ -730,9 +728,7 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
let noise_h_next = mix_hash(&noise_h, &pkt_assembled[HEADER_SIZE..]);
// Decrypt and authenticate init packet, also proving that caller knows our static identity.
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(
&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES>(noise_es.as_bytes())
);
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES>(noise_es.as_bytes()));
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&incoming_message_nonce);
gcm.aad(&noise_h);
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut pkt_assembled[AliceNoiseXKInit::ENC_START..AliceNoiseXKInit::AUTH_START]);
@ -753,10 +749,10 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
// a Kyber ciphertext to send back to Alice.
let bob_noise_e_secret = P384KeyPair::generate();
let bob_noise_e = bob_noise_e_secret.public_key_bytes().clone();
let noise_es_ee = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let noise_es_ee = hmac_sha512_secret(
noise_es.as_bytes(),
bob_noise_e_secret.agree(&alice_noise_e).ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?.as_bytes(),
));
);
let (bob_hk_ciphertext, hk) = pqc_kyber::encapsulate(&pkt.alice_hk_public, &mut random::SecureRandom::default())
.map_err(|_| Error::FailedAuthentication)
.map(|(ct, hk)| (ct, Secret(hk)))?;
@ -780,9 +776,7 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
ack.bob_hk_ciphertext = bob_hk_ciphertext;
// Encrypt main section of reply and attach tag.
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(
&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE>(noise_es_ee.as_bytes())
);
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE>(noise_es_ee.as_bytes()));
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&create_message_nonce(PACKET_TYPE_BOB_NOISE_XK_ACK, 1));
gcm.aad(&noise_h_next);
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut ack_packet[BobNoiseXKAck::ENC_START..BobNoiseXKAck::AUTH_START]);
@ -869,22 +863,20 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
// Derive noise_es_ee from Bob's ephemeral public key.
let bob_noise_e = P384PublicKey::from_bytes(&pkt.bob_noise_e).ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?;
let noise_es_ee = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let noise_es_ee = hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(
outgoing_offer.noise_es.as_bytes(),
outgoing_offer
.alice_noise_e_secret
.agree(&bob_noise_e)
.ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?
.as_bytes(),
));
);
// Go ahead and compute the next 'h' state before we lose the ciphertext in decrypt.
let noise_h_next = mix_hash(&mix_hash(&outgoing_offer.noise_h, bob_noise_e.as_bytes()), &pkt_assembled[HEADER_SIZE..]);
// Decrypt and authenticate Bob's reply.
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(
&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE>(noise_es_ee.as_bytes())
);
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE>(noise_es_ee.as_bytes()));
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&incoming_message_nonce);
gcm.aad(&outgoing_offer.noise_h);
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut pkt_assembled[BobNoiseXKAck::ENC_START..BobNoiseXKAck::AUTH_START]);
@ -902,16 +894,17 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
let hk = pqc_kyber::decapsulate(&pkt.bob_hk_ciphertext, outgoing_offer.alice_hk_secret.as_bytes())
.map_err(|_| Error::FailedAuthentication)
.map(|k| Secret(k))?;
let noise_es_ee_se_hk_psk = Secret(hmac_sha512(
&hmac_sha512(
let noise_es_ee_se_hk_psk = hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(
hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(
noise_es_ee.as_bytes(),
app.get_local_s_keypair()
.agree(&bob_noise_e)
.ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?
.as_bytes(),
),
&hmac_sha512(session.psk.as_bytes(), hk.as_bytes()),
));
)
.as_bytes(),
hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(session.psk.as_bytes(), hk.as_bytes()).as_bytes(),
);
let reply_message_nonce = create_message_nonce(PACKET_TYPE_ALICE_NOISE_XK_ACK, 2);
@ -927,12 +920,9 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
let mut enc_start = reply_len;
reply_len = append_to_slice(&mut reply_buffer, reply_len, alice_s_public_blob)?;
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(
&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE_HK>(&hmac_sha512(
noise_es_ee.as_bytes(),
hk.as_bytes(),
))
);
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE_HK>(
hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(noise_es_ee.as_bytes(), hk.as_bytes()).as_bytes(),
));
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&reply_message_nonce);
gcm.aad(&noise_h_next);
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut reply_buffer[enc_start..reply_len]);
@ -948,9 +938,9 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
enc_start = reply_len;
reply_len = append_to_slice(&mut reply_buffer, reply_len, metadata)?;
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(
&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE_SE_HK_PSK>(noise_es_ee_se_hk_psk.as_bytes())
);
let mut gcm = AesGcm::new(&kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE_SE_HK_PSK>(
noise_es_ee_se_hk_psk.as_bytes(),
));
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&reply_message_nonce);
gcm.aad(&noise_h_next);
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut reply_buffer[enc_start..reply_len]);
@ -1025,10 +1015,9 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
let alice_static_public_blob = r.read_decrypt_auth(
alice_static_public_blob_size,
kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE_HK>(&hmac_sha512(
incoming.noise_es_ee.as_bytes(),
incoming.hk.as_bytes(),
)),
kbkdf::<AES_256_KEY_SIZE, KBKDF_KEY_USAGE_LABEL_KEX_ES_EE_HK>(
hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(incoming.noise_es_ee.as_bytes(), incoming.hk.as_bytes()).as_bytes(),
),
&incoming.noise_h,
&incoming_message_nonce,
)?;
@ -1044,17 +1033,18 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
let noise_h_next = mix_hash(&noise_h_next, psk.as_bytes());
// Complete Noise_XKpsk3 on Bob's side.
let noise_es_ee_se_hk_psk = Secret(hmac_sha512(
&hmac_sha512(
let noise_es_ee_se_hk_psk = hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(
hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(
incoming.noise_es_ee.as_bytes(),
incoming
.bob_noise_e_secret
.agree(&alice_noise_s)
.ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?
.as_bytes(),
),
&hmac_sha512(psk.as_bytes(), incoming.hk.as_bytes()),
));
)
.as_bytes(),
hmac_sha512_secret::<BASE_KEY_SIZE>(psk.as_bytes(), incoming.hk.as_bytes()).as_bytes(),
);
// Decrypt meta-data and verify the final key in the process. Copy meta-data
// into the temporary data buffer to return.
@ -1136,10 +1126,10 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
let pkt: &RekeyInit = byte_array_as_proto_buffer(&pkt_assembled).unwrap();
if let Some(alice_e) = P384PublicKey::from_bytes(&pkt.alice_e) {
let bob_e_secret = P384KeyPair::generate();
let next_session_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let next_session_key = hmac_sha512_secret(
key.ratchet_key.as_bytes(),
bob_e_secret.agree(&alice_e).ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?.as_bytes(),
));
);
let mut reply_buf = [0u8; RekeyAck::SIZE];
let reply: &mut RekeyAck = byte_array_as_proto_buffer_mut(&mut reply_buf).unwrap();
@ -1222,10 +1212,10 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Context<Application> {
if aead_authentication_ok {
let pkt: &RekeyAck = byte_array_as_proto_buffer(&pkt_assembled).unwrap();
if let Some(bob_e) = P384PublicKey::from_bytes(&pkt.bob_e) {
let next_session_key = Secret(hmac_sha512(
let next_session_key = hmac_sha512_secret(
key.ratchet_key.as_bytes(),
alice_e_secret.agree(&bob_e).ok_or(Error::FailedAuthentication)?.as_bytes(),
));
);
if secure_eq(&pkt.next_key_fingerprint, &SHA384::hash(next_session_key.as_bytes())) {
// The new "Alice" knows Bob has the key since this is an ACK, so she can go
@ -1385,29 +1375,27 @@ impl<Application: ApplicationLayer> Session<Application> {
gcm.reset_init_gcm(&create_message_nonce(PACKET_TYPE_REKEY_INIT, counter.get()));
gcm.crypt_in_place(&mut rekey_buf[RekeyInit::ENC_START..RekeyInit::AUTH_START]);
rekey_buf[RekeyInit::AUTH_START..].copy_from_slice(&gcm.finish_encrypt());
drop(gcm);
} else {
return;
};
debug_assert!(rekey_buf.len() <= MIN_TRANSPORT_MTU);
set_packet_header(
&mut rekey_buf,
1,
0,
PACKET_TYPE_REKEY_INIT,
u64::from(remote_session_id),
state.current_key,
counter.get(),
);
debug_assert!(rekey_buf.len() <= MIN_TRANSPORT_MTU);
set_packet_header(
&mut rekey_buf,
1,
0,
PACKET_TYPE_REKEY_INIT,
u64::from(remote_session_id),
state.current_key,
counter.get(),
);
//drop(key);
//drop(gcm);
//drop(state);
self.header_protection_cipher
.encrypt_block_in_place(&mut rekey_buf[HEADER_PROTECT_ENCRYPT_START..HEADER_PROTECT_ENCRYPT_END]);
send(&mut rekey_buf);
self.header_protection_cipher
.encrypt_block_in_place(&mut rekey_buf[HEADER_PROTECT_ENCRYPT_START..HEADER_PROTECT_ENCRYPT_END]);
send(&mut rekey_buf);
self.state.write().unwrap().current_offer = Offer::RekeyInit(rekey_e, current_time);
}
drop(state);
self.state.write().unwrap().current_offer = Offer::RekeyInit(rekey_e, current_time);
}
}
}
@ -1589,7 +1577,7 @@ impl SessionKey {
if counter < self.expire_at_counter {
for mutex in &self.send_cipher_pool {
if let Ok(guard) = mutex.try_lock() {
return Ok(guard)
return Ok(guard);
}
}
Ok(self.send_cipher_pool[0].lock().unwrap())
@ -1601,7 +1589,7 @@ impl SessionKey {
fn get_receive_cipher<'a>(&'a self) -> MutexGuard<'a, AesGcm<false>> {
for mutex in &self.receive_cipher_pool {
if let Ok(guard) = mutex.try_lock() {
return guard
return guard;
}
}
self.receive_cipher_pool[0].lock().unwrap()