/* * Copyright (c)2013-2020 ZeroTier, Inc. * * Use of this software is governed by the Business Source License included * in the LICENSE.TXT file in the project's root directory. * * Change Date: 2024-01-01 * * On the date above, in accordance with the Business Source License, use * of this software will be governed by version 2.0 of the Apache License. */ /****/ #ifndef ZT_MEMBERSHIP_HPP #define ZT_MEMBERSHIP_HPP #include #include "Constants.hpp" #include "Credential.hpp" #include "Hashtable.hpp" #include "CertificateOfMembership.hpp" #include "Capability.hpp" #include "Tag.hpp" #include "Revocation.hpp" #include "NetworkConfig.hpp" namespace ZeroTier { class RuntimeEnvironment; class Network; /** * A container for certificates of membership and other network credentials * * This is essentially a relational join between Peer and Network. * * This class is not thread safe. It must be locked externally. */ class Membership { public: enum AddCredentialResult { ADD_REJECTED, ADD_ACCEPTED_NEW, ADD_ACCEPTED_REDUNDANT, ADD_DEFERRED_FOR_WHOIS }; Membership(); ~Membership(); /** * Send COM and other credentials to this peer * * @param RR Runtime environment * @param tPtr Thread pointer to be handed through to any callbacks called as a result of this call * @param now Current time * @param to Peer identity * @param nconf My network config */ void pushCredentials(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,int64_t now,const Identity &to,const NetworkConfig &nconf); /** * @return Time we last pushed credentials to this member */ ZT_INLINE int64_t lastPushedCredentials() const noexcept { return _lastPushedCredentials; } /** * Check whether the peer represented by this Membership owns a given address * * @tparam Type of resource: InetAddress or MAC * @param nconf Our network config * @param r Resource to check * @return True if this peer has a certificate of ownership for the given resource */ template ZT_INLINE bool peerOwnsAddress(const NetworkConfig &nconf,const T &r) const noexcept { if (_isUnspoofableAddress(nconf,r)) return true; uint32_t *k = nullptr; CertificateOfOwnership *v = nullptr; Hashtable< uint32_t,CertificateOfOwnership >::Iterator i(*(const_cast< Hashtable< uint32_t,CertificateOfOwnership> *>(&_remoteCoos))); while (i.next(k,v)) { if (_isCredentialTimestampValid(nconf,*v)&&(v->owns(r))) return true; } return false; } /** * Get a remote member's tag (if we have it) * * @param nconf Network configuration * @param id Tag ID * @return Pointer to tag or NULL if not found */ ZT_INLINE const Tag *getTag(const NetworkConfig &nconf,const uint32_t id) const noexcept { const Tag *const t = _remoteTags.get(id); return (((t)&&(_isCredentialTimestampValid(nconf,*t))) ? t : (Tag *)0); } /** * Clean internal databases of stale entries * * @param now Current time * @param nconf Current network configuration */ void clean(int64_t now,const NetworkConfig &nconf); /** * Generates a key for internal use in indexing credentials by type and credential ID */ static ZT_INLINE uint64_t credentialKey(const ZT_CredentialType &t,const uint32_t i) noexcept { return (((uint64_t)t << 32U) | (uint64_t)i); } /** * Check if our local COM agrees with theirs, with possible memo-ization. * * @param localCom */ ZT_INLINE bool certificateOfMembershipAgress(const CertificateOfMembership &localCom,const Identity &remoteIdentity) { if ((_comAgreementLocalTimestamp == localCom.timestamp())&&(_comAgreementRemoteTimestamp == _com.timestamp())) return true; if (_com.agreesWith(localCom)) { // SECURITY: newer network controllers embed the full fingerprint into the COM. If we are // joined to a network managed by one of these, our COM will contain one. If it's present // we compare vs the other and require them to match. If our COM does not contain a full // identity fingerprint we compare by address only, which is a legacy mode supported for // old network controllers. Note that this is safe because the controller issues us our COM // and in so doing indicates if it's new or old. However this will go away after a while // once we can be pretty sure there are no ancient controllers around. if (localCom.issuedTo().haveHash()) { if (localCom.issuedTo() != _com.issuedTo()) return false; } else { // LEGACY: support networks run by old controllers. if (localCom.issuedTo().address() != _com.issuedTo().address()) return false; } // Remember that these two COMs agreed. If any are updated this is invalidated and a full // agreement check will be done again. _comAgreementLocalTimestamp = localCom.timestamp(); _comAgreementRemoteTimestamp = _com.timestamp(); return true; } return false; } AddCredentialResult addCredential(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Identity &sourcePeerIdentity,const NetworkConfig &nconf,const CertificateOfMembership &com); AddCredentialResult addCredential(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Identity &sourcePeerIdentity,const NetworkConfig &nconf,const Tag &tag); AddCredentialResult addCredential(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Identity &sourcePeerIdentity,const NetworkConfig &nconf,const Capability &cap); AddCredentialResult addCredential(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Identity &sourcePeerIdentity,const NetworkConfig &nconf,const CertificateOfOwnership &coo); AddCredentialResult addCredential(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,const Identity &sourcePeerIdentity,const NetworkConfig &nconf,const Revocation &rev); private: // This returns true if a resource is an IPv6 NDP-emulated address. These embed the ZT // address of the peer and therefore cannot be spoofed, causing peerOwnsAddress() to // always return true for them. A certificate is not required for these. ZT_INLINE bool _isUnspoofableAddress(const NetworkConfig &nconf,const MAC &m) const noexcept { return false; } bool _isUnspoofableAddress(const NetworkConfig &nconf,const InetAddress &ip) const noexcept; // This compares the remote credential's timestamp to the timestamp in our network config // plus or minus the permitted maximum timestamp delta. template ZT_INLINE bool _isCredentialTimestampValid(const NetworkConfig &nconf,const C &remoteCredential) const noexcept { const int64_t ts = remoteCredential.timestamp(); if (((ts >= nconf.timestamp) ? (ts - nconf.timestamp) : (nconf.timestamp - ts)) <= nconf.credentialTimeMaxDelta) { const int64_t *threshold = _revocations.get(credentialKey(C::credentialType(),remoteCredential.id())); return ((!threshold)||(ts > *threshold)); } return false; } template ZT_INLINE void _cleanCredImpl(const NetworkConfig &nconf,Hashtable &remoteCreds) { uint32_t *k = nullptr; C *v = nullptr; typename Hashtable::Iterator i(remoteCreds); while (i.next(k,v)) { if (!_isCredentialTimestampValid(nconf,*v)) remoteCreds.erase(*k); } } // Revocation threshold for COM or 0 if none int64_t _comRevocationThreshold; // Time we last pushed credentials int64_t _lastPushedCredentials; // COM timestamps at which we last agreed-- used to memo-ize agreement and avoid having to recompute constantly. int64_t _comAgreementLocalTimestamp,_comAgreementRemoteTimestamp; // Remote member's latest network COM CertificateOfMembership _com; // Revocations by credentialKey() Hashtable< uint64_t,int64_t > _revocations; // Remote credentials that we have received from this member (and that are valid) Hashtable< uint32_t,Tag > _remoteTags; Hashtable< uint32_t,Capability > _remoteCaps; Hashtable< uint32_t,CertificateOfOwnership > _remoteCoos; public: class CapabilityIterator { public: ZT_INLINE CapabilityIterator(Membership &m,const NetworkConfig &nconf) noexcept : _hti(m._remoteCaps), _k(nullptr), _c(nullptr), _m(m), _nconf(nconf) { } ZT_INLINE Capability *next() noexcept { while (_hti.next(_k,_c)) { if (_m._isCredentialTimestampValid(_nconf,*_c)) return _c; } return nullptr; } private: Hashtable< uint32_t,Capability >::Iterator _hti; uint32_t *_k; Capability *_c; Membership &_m; const NetworkConfig &_nconf; }; }; } // namespace ZeroTier #endif