mirror of
https://github.com/zerotier/ZeroTierOne.git
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91 lines
3.9 KiB
C++
91 lines
3.9 KiB
C++
/*
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* Copyright (c)2013-2021 ZeroTier, Inc.
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*
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* Use of this software is governed by the Business Source License included
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* in the LICENSE.TXT file in the project's root directory.
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*
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* Change Date: 2026-01-01
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*
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* On the date above, in accordance with the Business Source License, use
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* of this software will be governed by version 2.0 of the Apache License.
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*/
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/****/
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#include "Constants.hpp"
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#include "RuntimeEnvironment.hpp"
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#include "Credential.hpp"
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#include "CapabilityCredential.hpp"
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#include "TagCredential.hpp"
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#include "MembershipCredential.hpp"
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#include "OwnershipCredential.hpp"
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#include "RevocationCredential.hpp"
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#include "Network.hpp"
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#include "Topology.hpp"
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// These are compile-time asserts to make sure temporary marshal buffers here and
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// also in NtworkConfig.cpp are always large enough to marshal all credential types.
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#if ZT_TAG_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX > ZT_BUF_MEM_SIZE
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#error ZT_TAG_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX exceeds maximum buffer size
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#endif
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#if ZT_CAPABILITY_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX > ZT_BUF_MEM_SIZE
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#error ZT_CAPABILITY_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX exceeds maximum buffer size
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#endif
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#if ZT_REVOCATION_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX > ZT_BUF_MEM_SIZE
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#error ZT_REVOCATION_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX exceeds maximum buffer size
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#endif
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#if ZT_CERTIFICATEOFOWNERSHIP_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX > ZT_BUF_MEM_SIZE
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#error ZT_CERTIFICATEOFOWNERSHIP_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX exceeds maximum buffer size
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#endif
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#if ZT_MEMBERSHIP_CREDENTIAL_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX > ZT_BUF_MEM_SIZE
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#error ZT_MEMBERSHIP_CREDENTIAL_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX exceeds maximum buffer size
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#endif
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namespace ZeroTier {
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template<typename CRED>
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static ZT_INLINE Credential::VerifyResult p_credVerify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR,void *tPtr,CRED credential)
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{
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uint8_t tmp[ZT_BUF_MEM_SIZE + 16];
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const Address signedBy(credential.signer());
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const uint64_t networkId = credential.networkId();
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if ((!signedBy)||(signedBy != Network::controllerFor(networkId)))
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return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
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const SharedPtr<Peer> peer(RR->topology->peer(tPtr,signedBy));
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if (!peer)
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return Credential::VERIFY_NEED_IDENTITY;
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try {
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int l = credential.marshal(tmp,true);
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if (l <= 0)
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return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
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return (peer->identity().verify(tmp,(unsigned int)l,credential.signature(),credential.signatureLength()) ? Credential::VERIFY_OK : Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE);
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} catch ( ... ) {}
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return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
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}
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Credential::VerifyResult Credential::s_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR, void *tPtr, const RevocationCredential &credential) { return p_credVerify(RR, tPtr, credential); }
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Credential::VerifyResult Credential::s_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR, void *tPtr, const TagCredential &credential) { return p_credVerify(RR, tPtr, credential); }
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Credential::VerifyResult Credential::s_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR, void *tPtr, const CapabilityCredential &credential) { return p_credVerify(RR, tPtr, credential); }
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Credential::VerifyResult Credential::s_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR, void *tPtr, const OwnershipCredential &credential) { return p_credVerify(RR, tPtr, credential); }
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Credential::VerifyResult Credential::s_verify(const RuntimeEnvironment *RR, void *tPtr, const MembershipCredential &credential)
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{
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// Sanity check network ID.
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if ((!credential.m_signedBy) || (credential.m_signedBy != Network::controllerFor(credential.m_networkId)))
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return Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
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// If we don't know the peer, get its identity. This shouldn't happen here but should be handled.
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const SharedPtr<Peer> peer(RR->topology->peer(tPtr,credential.m_signedBy));
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if (!peer)
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return Credential::VERIFY_NEED_IDENTITY;
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// Now verify the controller's signature.
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uint64_t buf[ZT_MEMBERSHIP_CREDENTIAL_MARSHAL_SIZE_MAX / 8];
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const unsigned int bufSize = credential.m_fillSigningBuf(buf);
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return peer->identity().verify(buf, bufSize, credential.m_signature, credential.m_signatureLength) ? Credential::VERIFY_OK : Credential::VERIFY_BAD_SIGNATURE;
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}
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} // namespace ZeroTier
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