Document iptables rules (#854)

* Remove firewall rule related to the old proxy role

* Remove proxy conditionals from mobileconfig template

* Add comments explaining firewall rules
This commit is contained in:
Micah R Ledbetter 2018-03-28 13:17:56 -05:00 committed by Dan Guido
parent aea9c9a5e2
commit 4b0aea8f5a
4 changed files with 102 additions and 25 deletions

View file

@ -9,7 +9,6 @@
- name: Set facts for mobileconfigs
set_fact:
proxy_enabled: false
PayloadContentCA: "{{ lookup('file' , 'configs/{{ IP_subject_alt_name }}/pki/cacert.pem')|b64encode }}"
- name: Build the mobileconfigs

View file

@ -124,24 +124,12 @@
<key>Proxies</key>
<dict>
<key>HTTPEnable</key>
{% if proxy_enabled is defined and proxy_enabled == true %}
<integer>1</integer>
<key>HTTPPort</key>
<integer>8118</integer>
<key>HTTPProxy</key>
<string>{{ local_service_ip }}</string>
{% else %}
<integer>0</integer>
{% endif %}
<key>HTTPSEnable</key>
<integer>0</integer>
</dict>
<key>UserDefinedName</key>
{% if proxy_enabled is defined and proxy_enabled == true %}
<string>Algo VPN {{ IP_subject_alt_name }} IKEv2 with proxy</string>
{% else %}
<string>Algo VPN {{ IP_subject_alt_name }} IKEv2</string>
{% endif %}
<key>VPNType</key>
<string>IKEv2</string>
</dict>
@ -187,17 +175,9 @@
</dict>
</array>
<key>PayloadDisplayName</key>
{% if proxy_enabled is defined and proxy_enabled == true %}
<string>{{ IP_subject_alt_name }} IKEv2 with proxy</string>
{% else %}
<string>{{ IP_subject_alt_name }} IKEv2</string>
{% endif %}
<key>PayloadIdentifier</key>
{% if proxy_enabled is defined and proxy_enabled == true %}
<string>donut.local.{{ 600000 | random | to_uuid | upper }}</string>
{% else %}
<string>donut.local.{{ 500000 | random | to_uuid | upper }}</string>
{% endif %}
<key>PayloadRemovalDisallowed</key>
<false/>
<key>PayloadType</key>

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@ -1,43 +1,95 @@
#### The mangle table
# This table allows us to modify packet headers
# Packets enter this table first
#
*mangle
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
{% if max_mss is defined %}
# MSS is the TCP Max Segment Size
# Setting the 'max_mss' Ansible variable can solve some issues related to packet fragmentation
# This appears to be necessary on (at least) Google Cloud,
# however, some routers also require a change to this parameter
# See also:
# - https://github.com/trailofbits/algo/issues/216
# - https://github.com/trailofbits/algo/issues?utf8=%E2%9C%93&q=is%3Aissue%20mtu
# - https://serverfault.com/questions/601143/ssh-not-working-over-ipsec-tunnel-strongswan
-A FORWARD -s {{ vpn_network }} -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN -j TCPMSS --set-mss {{ max_mss }}
{% endif %}
COMMIT
#### The nat table
# This table enables Network Address Translation
# (This is technically a type of packet mangling)
#
*nat
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
# Allow traffic from the VPN network to the outside world, and replies
-A POSTROUTING -s {{ vpn_network }} -m policy --pol none --dir out -j MASQUERADE
COMMIT
#### The filter table
# The default ipfilter table
#
*filter
# By default, drop packets that are destined for this server
:INPUT DROP [0:0]
# By default, drop packets that request to be forwarded by this server
:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
# By default, accept any packets originating from this server
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
# Accept packets destined for localhost
-A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
# Accept any packet from an open TCP connection
-A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# Accept packets using the encapsulation protocol
-A INPUT -p esp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p ah -j ACCEPT
# rate limit ICMP traffic per source
-A INPUT -p icmp --icmp-type echo-request -m hashlimit --hashlimit-upto 5/s --hashlimit-mode srcip --hashlimit-srcmask 32 --hashlimit-name icmp-echo-drop -j ACCEPT
# Accept IPSEC traffic to ports 500 (IPSEC) and 4500 (MOBIKE aka IKE + NAT traversal)
-A INPUT -p udp -m multiport --dports 500,4500 -j ACCEPT
# Allow new traffic to port 22 (SSH)
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT
# Allow any traffic from the VPN
-A INPUT -p ipencap -m policy --dir in --pol ipsec --proto esp -j ACCEPT
# TODO:
# The IP of the resolver should be bound to a DUMMY interface.
# DUMMY interfaces are the proper way to install IPs without assigning them any
# particular virtual (tun,tap,...) or physical (ethernet) interface.
# Accept DNS traffic to the local DNS resolver
-A INPUT -d {{ local_service_ip }} -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -d {{ local_service_ip }} -p tcp -m multiport --dport 8080,8118 -j ACCEPT
{% if BetweenClients_DROP is defined and BetweenClients_DROP == "Y" %}
# Drop traffic between VPN clients
-A FORWARD -s {{ vpn_network }} -d {{ vpn_network }} -j DROP
{% endif %}
# Forward any packet that's part of an established connection
-A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# Drop SMB/CIFS traffic that requests to be forwarded
-A FORWARD -p tcp --dport 445 -j DROP
# Drop NETBIOS trafic that requests to be forwarded
-A FORWARD -p udp -m multiport --ports 137,138 -j DROP
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m multiport --ports 137,139 -j DROP
# Forward any IPSEC traffic from the VPN network
-A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -s {{ vpn_network }} -m policy --pol ipsec --dir in -j ACCEPT
COMMIT

View file

@ -1,43 +1,89 @@
#### The mangle table
# This table allows us to modify packet headers
# Packets enter this table first
#
*mangle
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
:INPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
:FORWARD ACCEPT [0:0]
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
{% if max_mss is defined %}
# MSS is the TCP Max Segment Size
# See rules.v4 for a more complete explanation
-A FORWARD -s {{ vpn_network_ipv6 }} -p tcp -m tcp --tcp-flags SYN,RST SYN -j TCPMSS --set-mss {{ max_mss }}
{% endif %}
COMMIT
#### The nat table
# This table enables Network Address Translation
# (This is technically a type of packet mangling)
#
*nat
:PREROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
:POSTROUTING ACCEPT [0:0]
# Allow traffic from the VPN network to the outside world, and replies
-A POSTROUTING -s {{ vpn_network_ipv6 }} -m policy --pol none --dir out -j MASQUERADE
COMMIT
#### The filter table
# The default ipfilter table
#
*filter
# By default, drop packets that are destined for this server
:INPUT DROP [0:0]
# By default, drop packets that request to be forwarded by this server
:FORWARD DROP [0:0]
# By default, accept any packets originating from this server
:OUTPUT ACCEPT [0:0]
# Create the ICMPV6-CHECK chain and its log chain
# These chains are used later to prevent a type of bug that would
# allow malicious traffic to reach over the server into the private network
# An instance of such a bug on Cisco software is described here:
# https://www.insinuator.net/2016/05/cve-2016-1409-ipv6-ndp-dos-vulnerability-in-cisco-software/
# other software implementations might be at least as broken as the one in CISCO gear.
:ICMPV6-CHECK - [0:0]
:ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG - [0:0]
# Accept packets destined for localhost
-A INPUT -i lo -j ACCEPT
# Accept any packet from an open TCP connection
-A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
# Accept packets using the encapsulation protocol
-A INPUT -p esp -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -m ah -j ACCEPT
# rate limit ICMP traffic per source
-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type echo-request -m hashlimit --hashlimit-upto 5/s --hashlimit-mode srcip --hashlimit-srcmask 32 --hashlimit-name icmp-echo-drop -j ACCEPT
# Accept IPSEC traffic to ports 500 (IPSEC) and 4500 (MOBIKE aka IKE + NAT traversal)
-A INPUT -p udp -m multiport --dports 500,4500 -j ACCEPT
# Allow new traffic to port 22 (SSH)
-A INPUT -p tcp --dport 22 -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -j ACCEPT
# Accept properly formatted Neighbor Discovery Protocol packets
-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type router-advertisement -m hl --hl-eq 255 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type neighbor-solicitation -m hl --hl-eq 255 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type neighbor-advertisement -m hl --hl-eq 255 -j ACCEPT
-A INPUT -p icmpv6 --icmpv6-type redirect -m hl --hl-eq 255 -j ACCEPT
# DHCP in AWS
-A INPUT -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -m udp -p udp --dport 546 -d fe80::/64 -j ACCEPT
# TODO:
# The IP of the resolver should be bound to a DUMMY interface.
# DUMMY interfaces are the proper way to install IPs without assigning them any
# particular virtual (tun,tap,...) or physical (ethernet) interface.
# Accept DNS traffic to the local DNS resolver
-A INPUT -d fcaa::1 -p udp --dport 53 -j ACCEPT
{% if BetweenClients_DROP is defined and BetweenClients_DROP == "Y" %}
-A FORWARD -s {{ vpn_network_ipv6 }} -d {{ vpn_network_ipv6 }} -j DROP
{% endif %}
@ -47,13 +93,13 @@ COMMIT
-A FORWARD -p tcp -m multiport --ports 137,139 -j DROP
-A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate RELATED,ESTABLISHED -j ACCEPT
-A FORWARD -m conntrack --ctstate NEW -s {{ vpn_network_ipv6 }} -m policy --pol ipsec --dir in -j ACCEPT
# this is so potential malicious traffic can not reach anywhere over the server
# https://www.insinuator.net/2016/05/cve-2016-1409-ipv6-ndp-dos-vulnerability-in-cisco-software/
# other software implementations might be at least as broken as the one in CISCO gear.
# Use the ICMPV6-CHECK chain, described above
-A ICMPV6-CHECK -p icmpv6 -m hl ! --hl-eq 255 --icmpv6-type router-solicitation -j ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG
-A ICMPV6-CHECK -p icmpv6 -m hl ! --hl-eq 255 --icmpv6-type router-advertisement -j ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG
-A ICMPV6-CHECK -p icmpv6 -m hl ! --hl-eq 255 --icmpv6-type neighbor-solicitation -j ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG
-A ICMPV6-CHECK -p icmpv6 -m hl ! --hl-eq 255 --icmpv6-type neighbor-advertisement -j ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG
-A ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG -j LOG --log-prefix "ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG DROP "
-A ICMPV6-CHECK-LOG -j DROP
COMMIT