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This commit is contained in:
Adam Ierymenko 2020-03-02 14:39:42 -08:00
parent 416068f68e
commit 51f0882849
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: C8877CF2D7A5D7F3
2 changed files with 5 additions and 13 deletions
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13
node/C25519.hpp
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@ -78,15 +78,10 @@ public:
/** /**
* Sign a message with a sender's key pair * Sign a message with a sender's key pair
* *
* This takes the SHA-521 of msg[] and then signs the first 32 bytes of this * For legacy reasons ZeroTier ed25519 signatures end with an additional 32 bytes
* digest, returning it and the 64-byte ed25519 signature in signature[]. * that are the first 32 bytes of SHA512(msg). The verify() function considers these
* This results in a signature that verifies both the signer's authenticity * bytes optional and will accept signatures of 64 or 96 bytes in length, checking
* and the integrity of the message. * the hash bytes if they are present.
*
* This is based on the original ed25519 code from NaCl and the SUPERCOP
* cipher benchmark suite, but with the modification that it always
* produces a signature of fixed 96-byte length based on the hash of an
* arbitrary-length message.
* *
* @param myPrivate My private key * @param myPrivate My private key
* @param myPublic My public key * @param myPublic My public key

5
node/Identity.cpp
View file

@ -189,11 +189,8 @@ unsigned int Identity::sign(const void *data,unsigned int len,void *sig,unsigned
case P384: case P384:
if (siglen >= ZT_ECC384_SIGNATURE_SIZE) { if (siglen >= ZT_ECC384_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
// For P384 we sign SHA384(data | public keys) for added defense against any attack
// that attempted to decouple the two keys in some way. Otherwise this has no impact
// on the security of the signature (unless SHA384 had some serious flaw).
uint8_t h[48]; uint8_t h[48];
SHA384(h,data,len,&_pub,ZT_IDENTITY_P384_COMPOUND_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE); SHA384(h,data,len,&_pub,ZT_IDENTITY_P384_COMPOUND_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE); // include C25519 public key in hash
ECC384ECDSASign(_priv.p384,h,(uint8_t *)sig); ECC384ECDSASign(_priv.p384,h,(uint8_t *)sig);
return ZT_ECC384_SIGNATURE_SIZE; return ZT_ECC384_SIGNATURE_SIZE;
} }